Enligt polisen deltog 60 i demonstrationen. Men det var minst Polisen angav 81 demonstranter. Demonstrationen i Bryssel var upptakten till en rad planerade regionala strejker och demonstrationer. Under pariserhjulet avslutades demonstrationen.
En veteran i de fackliga demonstrationerna. Vi vet inte ens om den blir av. Italien, Spanien och Portugal och Irland. Solidaritet med det utsatta grekiska folket — inte med bankernas slavavtal!
Inte riksdagsfraktionen, tack och lov. Today is a tragic day for Greece and for its Left. More than two thirds of Syriza MPs voted jointly with the pro-austerity parties New Democracy, Pasok, Potami and the junior coalition partner Anel the prerequisite bill for the toughest by far austerity package ever accepted by any kind of left including social-democracy government in Europe, the only possible comparison being the 1st Memorandum passed by Pasok in But 38 Syriza MPs out of a total of saved the honour: In any case, the government has lost control of its own majority: However it seems clear that it is only a matter of time for this new de facto pro-austerity majority to translate in a proper political coalition of some sort.
Du hittar uttalandet nedan efter intervjun med Kouvelakis. Tsipras, who it has to be said is a kind of a gambler as a politician, thought of the referendum — an idea that was not entirely new and which was floated before by others in the government including Yanis Varoufakis — not as a break with the negotiating process but as a tactical move that could strengthen his negotiating plan.
I can be certain about this, because I was privy to detailed reports about the crucial cabinet meeting on the evening of June 26, when the referendum was announced. Two things have to be said at this point. The first is that Tsipras and most of the people close to him thought it was going to be a walk in the park. And was pretty much the case before the closure of the banks.
The general sense was that the referendum would be won overwhelmingly, by over 70 percent. This was quite realistic, without the banks closing down the referendum would have been easily won, but the political significance of No would have been changed, because it would have happened without Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell confrontational and dramatic atmosphere created by the bank closure and the reaction of the Europeans.
What happened in that cabinet meeting was that a certain number of people — the rightist wing of the government, lead by Deputy Prime Minister Giannis Dragasakis — disagreed with the move. Dragasakis is actually the person who has been monitoring the whole negotiation process on the Greek side. Everyone on the negotiating team with the exception of the new finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos, are his people and he was the most prominent of those in the cabinet who really wanted to get rid of Varoufakis.
This wing thought that the referendum was a high-risk proposal, and they understood, in a way that Tsipras did not, that this was going to be a very confrontational move that would trigger a harsh reaction from the European side — and they were proved right. They were also afraid about the dynamic from below that would be released by this initiative. Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell of those present just laughed at this suggestion. I think this lack of awareness of what was going to happen is absolutely key to understanding the whole logic of the way the government has been operating so far.
In a way, as I have said, the right wing of Syriza was much more lucid about what they were up against. This explains also what happened during the week of the referendum at that level. Tsipras was put under extreme pressure by Dragasakis and others to withdraw the referendum. And that was the meaning of the kind of backtrack on the Wednesday before the vote? That Wednesday some people even talked about an internal coup happening, and Athens was brewing with rumors that Tsipras was going to withdraw the referendum.
During his speech he confirmed the referendum but also made it clear that the referendum was conceived as a tool for getting a better deal and that this was not the end of the negotiation but just the continuation under supposedly improved conditions. And he remained faithful to that line during that entire week.
That all gave the impression of complete amateurism and chaos. But what is absolutely clear is that it unleashed forces that Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell far beyond those intentions. Tsipras and the government were clearly overtaken by the momentum that was created by the referendum. They tried therefore by all means to put the devil back into the box. The way Tsipras dealt with pressure from Dragasakis — and why that Wednesday was so crucial — was that he accepted their line and sent that infamous letter to the Eurogroup and before that the letter asking for a new loan.
This opened up the path for what was to come the week after the Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell. But, on the other hand, in order to justify the fact that he could not without being totally ridiculed withdraw the referendum, he had to give some rationale for the initiative. He has to talk about fighting the austerity measures included in the Juncker package, about the blackmailing of the troika and the ultimatum he had been subjected to.
And, of course, the dynamic that was developing from below at that moment seized that opportunity, took him at his word, and went ahead and to wage the battle against the troika. They were however increasingly trapped by that line, and when they realized that they were trapped, they had no alternative strategy. They consistently refused any other strategy, and they also made it practically impossible for another approach to be implemented when there was still time for that.
Now, in the interview he gave a couple of days ago to New Statesman, Varoufakis says that a small team of people around him worked during the week leading to the referendum on an alternative plan including state control of the banks, issuing of IOUs and disconnection of the Greek central bank from the Frankfurt ECB, so on a sort of gradual exit. But that clearly came too late and was rejected by nearly all the rest of the economic team of the cabinet, by which he essentially means Dragasakis.
And Tsipras, of course, validated that decision. So we have to stress the continuity of the line of Tsipras.
Of course, objectively we can say that there has been a betrayal of the popular mandate, that people very legitimately feel they have been betrayed. However, the notion of betrayal usually means that at some moment you make a conscious decision of reneging on your own commitments. What I think actually happened was that Tsipras honestly believed that he could get a positive outcome by putting forward an approach centered on Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell and displaying good will, and this also Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell he constantly said he had no alternative plan.
On the other side, he showed for some months a capacity to resist to the escalating pressure and made some unpredictable moves such as the referendum or travelling to Moscow.
He thought this was the right mix to approach the issue, and what happens is that when you consistently follow this line you are led to a position in which you are left only with bad choices.
And the roots of that strategy: What is confusing to many is that you have a government composed of a large number of intellectuals, people who spent their whole lives studying contemporary capitalist political economy, both in the abstract and the concrete, people who are political activists.
I think we have to distinguish two elements within the government. The first is "Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell" rightist wing of the government led by two of the main economists, essentially Dragasakis but also Giorgos Stathakis.
And then the core leadership, Tsipras and the people around him. They knew very well that the Europeans would never accept a break with the memorandum. This is why Dragasakis from the outset did everything he could not to change the logic of the overall approach. He clearly sabotaged all the attempts for Syriza to have a proper economic program, even one within the framework that had been approved by the majority of the party.
He thought that the only thing you could get was an improved version of the memorandum framework. He wanted his hands completely free to negotiate the deal with the Europeans, without himself appearing too much at the stage, he succeeded in controlling the negotiation team, especially once Varoufakis had been sidelined. In summerhe gave a very interesting interview that created a lot of buzz at the time. And then you have the other approach, that of Tsipras, which was indeed rooted in the ideology of left-Europeanism.
I think the best illustration of that is Euclid Tsakalotos, a person who considers himself a staunch Marxist, someone who comes from the Eurocommunist tradition, we were in the same organization for years. The most typical statement from him which captures both his ideology and the outlook given to the government by the presence of all those academics is what he said in an interview to the French website Mediapart in April.
When asked what had struck Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell most since he was in government, he replied by saying that he was an academic, his job was to teach economics at a university, so when he went to Brussels he had prepared himself very seriously,
Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell had prepared a whole set of arguments and was expecting exactly elaborated counter-arguments to be presented.
But, instead of that, he just had to face people who were endlessly reciting rules and procedures and so on. Tsakalotos said he was very disappointed by the low level of the discussion.
From this it is quite clear that these people were expecting the confrontation with the EU to happen along the lines of an academic conference when you go with a nice paper and you expect a kind of nice counter-paper to be presented.
I think this is telling about what the Left is about Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell. The Left is filled with lots "Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell" people who are well-meaning, but who are totally impotent on the field of real politics. What he was saying was that we have to play the game until the very, very, very end and then they would retreat, because supposedly the damage that they would endure had they not retreated was too great for them to accept.
But what actually happened was akin to a fight between two people, where one person risks the pain and damage of losing a toe and the other their two legs. So it is true that there was a lack of elementary realism and that this was directly connected with the major problem that the Left has to face today — namely, our own impotence.
And this Europeanism that you describe in the center faction of the Syriza leadership, what is its ideological nature?
Because these are not liberals or even Negrian federalists — these are people who think of themselves in most cases as Marxists? I think that, in this case, Balibar is probably more relevant than Habermas. Once again, I think we have to take Tsakalotos at his word. When Mason asked him about the euro, Tsakalotos said that exit would be an absolute catastrophe and that Europe would relive the s with the return of competition between national currencies and the rise of various nationalisms and fascism.
So for these people the choice is between two things: I think that in this case we can clearly see what the ideology at work here is. This is the meaning of the kind of denunciations of Grexit as a Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell of return to the s or Grexit as a kind of apocalypse.
Exactly, I wrote as much a few years ago. Yes, Poulantzas talked about the European integration in the first part of his book on social classes in contemporary capitalism, in which he analyzes the processes of internationalization of capital and he clearly considered the European Economic Community an example of an imperialist form of internationalization of European capital within the framework of what he considered the new postwar structural hegemony of the United States.
But then something happened to trigger a counter-reaction of enormous scale from ordinary Greeks. Were they driven by national pride, was it mainly a class issue, or did, as Paul Mason and others speculate, memories of the
Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell War play a role? Of all the factors that you mentioned, the least relevant is the one that relates to the Civil War.
We have to see that No dominated in even very traditional right-wing areas of the country like Laconia, near Sparta, Messinia, or other areas in central Greece where the Right dominates like Evrytania. Even relatively mainstream commentators recognized that this was the most class-divided election in Greek history.
The hysterical backlash of dominant forces and the dramatic concrete situation created by the closure of banks and the cap on cash withdrawals and so on, created within the popular classes a very easy identification that the Yes camp was everything they hated.
The fact that the Yes camp mobilized all these hated politicians, pundits, business leaders, and media celebrities for their campaign only helped to inflame this class reaction. The second thing that is equally impressive is the radicalization of the youth. This is the first moment since the crisis that the youth in its mass actually made a unified statement. profilo-servis.info segelbat-nu-. profilo-servis.info strejkratten -svenska-modellen-aven-de-behover-trygghet T Z weekly.
Förlorade arbetsdagar på grund Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell strejk eller lockout, totalt. I Medlingsinstitutets intervjubok ”Evigt ung svensk modell? rädda jobb.
svensk och finländsk Begransad strejkratt raddar svensk modell, vilket har begränsat löne- och vinstutrymmet i dessa.
Det ser med andra ord ovanligt mörkt ut för svensk ekonomi. är ytterst begränsat” och “att det behövs säkerhetsmarginaler i det här läget”. Modellantaganden om jämvikt, rationalitet och kalkylerbara risker är i regel i dålig. vår tilltro till hoppet om superpolitiker som alltid likt Stålmannen räddar oss.